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    "comment": "ID: gov_action174lclj6wswk3km6chl755vp24ja44yy8fjput7z20795hdpuax7qq67pvcp\n \nI am voting NO on execution, not on premise. DRep attrition and voting-power concentration are real problems, and studying incentive design before committing to a permanent scheme is the right sequence. But this proposal falls short on its own terms:\n \nNo reviewable budget. Only workstream-level allocations are published. 884,000 ADA for modeling could fund two people or six, and DReps have no way to tell.\n \nHeavy overhead. Roughly 44% of the ask covers coordination, contingency, and oversight rather than research or engineering output.\n \nThe pilot mechanism is pre-selected. A proposal built on choosing mechanisms by evidence names the middle-out mechanism before any evidence work begins - and it originates with a paid consultant on the project. It will be the only candidate with live behavioural data.\n \nActivity-based KPIs. The proposal argues turnout is a poor proxy for value, then scores itself on workshop counts, simulation counts, dashboard counts, and page load speed. All are achievable without producing a framework anyone adopts.\n \nUnenforced coordination. Overlap with IOR's already-funded work is handled by a promise to return unused allocations, with no named arbiter and no MOU.\n \nI would support a revised version that publishes an operational budget with headcount and rates, gates disbursement on milestone acceptance, selects the pilot mechanism through the project's own process, and replaces activity metrics with adoption metrics.\n \nThe counterargument is fair: a badly designed permanent scheme would cost far more than 4.2M ADA, and delay lets the problem compound. I vote NO because approving this amount without a reviewable budget sets a precedent that weakens scrutiny of the larger requests to come.\n "
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